

OC 8089

7M 39486

Chief, SR Division

NOV 1958

Director of Communications

OC 8089

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Inspection Team Communications

Attached is a suggested position along with the arguments for and against on the subject of communications for ground inspection teams as you requested. Also attached is the material previously provided the Atomic Test Ban Conference concerning communications requirements for inspection teams. I have not had an opportunity to have these papers coordinated with DD/I. I will have this done and inform you of the results of this coordination after you arrive in Geneva.

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3 - OC-S Files  
✓ OC of OC-S  
SR  
Inspection Teams

25X1A9a OC-S: [REDACTED]:bjc/3021 (4 November 1958)

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**SUBJECT: Suggested Position with Regard to Control of  
Communications for Surprise Attack Conference**

1. There are two areas of communications concern in the forthcoming Geneva Surprise Attack conference which could affect objectives of this Agency. These are:

a. The degree of communications control which is exercised over electrical communications facilities to and from the inspection teams to be located in the Soviet bloc countries.

b. The freedom of censorship restrictions which may or may not be placed on these inspection teams.

2. It is assumed that the major communications problem for allied inspection teams is to communicate information which eventually will arrive at a point in the U. S. where retaliatory action can be taken. It would appear that an appropriate U. S. objective at the conference would be to have each inspection team provided with U. S. controlled communications capable of transmitting information from the team location to the appropriate command point in the U. S. without intervening human delays.

3. It is suggested that the following principles be incorporated in the U. S. position on this problem.

a. The host country will make available adequate and reliable communications facilities to the inspection teams in their country.

b. In addition all inspection teams will have the right to use their own communications facilities to any location outside the host

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country and will have the right to transmit without censorship or other restriction information in any form.

4. A listing of the arguments for the above principles are as follows:

a. Communications reliability will be considerably improved if a multiplicity of communications channels are provided.

b. A total disruption of all of the teams communications facilities by a host country will be much more difficult if the teams have their own communications facilities and have the capability of operating them.

c. The best "state of the art" communications techniques can be used by the inspecting teams, thereby making them increasingly effective concurrent with improvements in communications techniques. On the other hand if each team is dependent upon local communications facilities made available to it by the host country, there will undoubtedly be a considerable time lag between the development of new techniques and the host country's provision of them for use by the teams.

d. Weaknesses of any one inspecting team and/or of the whole system will not be divulged to the host country if each team has its own communications channel including secure ciphers. On the other hand if everything the inspectors report is capable of being monitored by the host country, the host country has an immediate check on whether or not the team is effective and can capitalize on this information in initiating a surprise attack.

e. An offer or an acceptance of the offer for free and unfettered communications to and from inspection teams could be interpreted by both parties as an act of good faith toward making the inspection team effective and workable.

f. A truly effective and reliable communications system from the team to its headquarters could in itself be a deterrent to the host country to even consider an action which could under normal circumstances lead to an increase in tension between the two countries or among the world powers.

5. The arguments against the above principles are as follows:

a. There will probably be some opposition in the U.S. to allowing "foreigners" to operate communications systems from U.S. soil. Currently, the Communications Act of 1934 prohibits such operation. This Act will have to be changed by Congress or superseded by a treaty which will have to be ratified by Congress.

b. The surveillance of Soviet or Soviet bloc teams in the U.S. will be considerably more difficult and would require more effort on the part of the U.S. if they are allowed to communicate without restriction and with their own facilities.

c. The Soviet bloc control of their own system within the U.S. will make it possible for them to conduct espionage operations using their team's communications as a tool.

d. The cost of maintaining the teams with their own communications facilities will be increased.

e. A number of technical problems such as the allocation of frequencies

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and limitation of transmitter power will be added to the many other problems of establishing an inspection team in a foreign country.

f. The communications facilities of an inspection team could conceivably be designed for use as part of a missile guidance system for their own missiles to home on the sites which they are inspecting.

WSG/bab - 12 June 1958

Check List of Communications Requirements

For

Nuclear Test Suspension Talks

1. Appropriate cleared frequencies and sufficient power to permit 24-hour, on a year-round basis, communications between:
  - a. Permanent bases within the USSR and external U. S. Communications bases.
  - b. The permanent bases themselves.
  - c. Permanent bases and mobile teams, either directly or via relay stations.
2. The right to use U. S. cryptographic systems and equipment on the above circuits.
3. Guarantee of freedom from accidental or intentional interference with these circuits.
4. Freedom of U. S. communications stations, both fixed and mobile from inspection.
5. Right to select the mode of emission, range of frequencies and appropriate equipment in accordance with communications requirements resulting from geography, natural phenomena or other factors having a significant effect on the efficiency of the communications circuits concerned.
6. Guarantee of adequate real estate on which to erect antennas of U. S. choosing.
7. Right to use available landline facilities, if desired, with rates to be mutually established.

Chief, SR Division

Director of Communications

4 Nov 58

OC 8090

M 39485

Discussion of the Use of High Speed Techniques  
for Communications with Inspection Teams

1. The two pieces of high speed communications equipment which were shown to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference were representative of some techniques which could be employed to provide reasonably reliable communications to and from inspection teams and their headquarters outside the country being inspected.

a. The RS-16 device shown has now reached the production stage and involves a principle of communications that is employed by the U.S. Air Force in one of their communications systems. Production of a sufficient quantity of the devices to outfit 100 inspection teams would take from one to two years. If any modification of the RS-16 demonstrated should be required, an additional year of design and testing time would have to be added. Since the technique used by this system is so widely known, this Agency would be willing to release it for use by the inspection teams if it were determined that its use would be to the best interest of the U.S. Government as a whole. Such use would not particularly harm any Agency interest.

b. The model of the RS-13 that was shown is a prototype. This device involved a unique technique which would fall in a relatively high classification category at this point in time. This Agency would not be willing to employ the use of this technique for the inspection teams without very careful consideration and weighing of the overall national interest. The exposure of this technique to the Soviets at this time would not be in the best interest of the Agency. I estimate that it would take at least four years before a sufficient quantity could be produced for use by the inspection teams.

2. I have coordinated the above with the appropriate Agency officials. It is my and their conclusion that the RS-16 technique can be made available to allied inspection teams if required. I do not believe that it would be appropriate or necessary to inform any of our Allies or the Soviets of the availability of this specific equipment or technique during the conference.

**SUBJECT: Discussion of the Use of High Speed Techniques  
for Communications with Inspection Teams**

I would suggest the knowledge of the availability of this technique be limited to the U. S. Delegation only.

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(OC, SR, Inspection Team)  
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